decisions … reflect and/or result from majority sentiment, but there are many instances in which they do not".
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In assessing mode, degrees, limits, alternative strengths and weaknesses, new basic questions arise, both as premises and consequences, about the institutional capabilities of the judiciary and of the political process, vis-a-vis societal goals.
19.
As a result, we simultaneously move from and towards a new assessment of the traditional distinction "between 'reason', the realm of 14 T.J. Miles, C.R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2008); Daniel Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72, Minnesota Law Review, 1331 ( 1988) ; or, in Europe, K. Hagel-Sorensen, U. Haltern, H. Koch, J.H.H Weiler (eds.), Europe: The New Legal Realism, (Kopenhagen 2010, Djøf Publishing) 15 Sir Garfield Barwick, Judiciary Law: Some Observations Thereon, 33 Current Legal Problems, 239, 241 (1980) 16 In the words of Lord Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers, 39 MLR 1, 41 (1976) 17 M. Cappelletti, Giudici legislatori?, supra note 9, at 129 18 M. Shapiro, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 24-25 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J 1966, Prentice-Hall) Massive and Complex Society, 86 Michigan Law Review, 660 (1988) some scholars even see institutional analysis as a new common ground and the "basis of a new synthesis of scholarly discourse about law".
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Several major constitutional theories set the stageknowingly or unknowingly -for comparative institutional analysis, often just starting, as mentioned, from an analysis of judicial review. The more we distance ourselves from the ideas of purely rational decisions, ideal institutions, clearly defined boundaries, optimal solutions, the more we need a realistic understanding of institutional capabilities and inter-branch dynamics. I think that the guidance of Komesar in this realm of "highly imperfect alternatives" can provide particularly valuable insight.
I will organize my reflections on this 'law and politics' debate, seen through the lens of the constitutional judicial role in a society, around a concept which is to some extent the spectre haunting it: 29 the concept of 'judicial activism'. This brief analysis starts from the realization of a persistent presence in both the public and the scientific debates; and it is built precisely around the use and misuse of this 'notoriously slippery term ', 30 born only relatively recently (if compared with the sensitivity of the problem itself), and intended to crystallize the anxieties and the variety of critical views on the interrelated, underlying matters.
My assumption is that the phrase 'judicial activism', however typical of a particular context such as the American one 31 and even though occasionally regarded as a gross, not strictly dogmatic or even legal category, 32 can be comparatively exported 33 and used as helpful tool for reflection by the constitutional justice scholar. If properly substantiated, it may represent (and to some extent make concrete) the latent and often intractable tensions inherent in traditional constitutional theories of judicial review. It can also serve precisely as the external, common thread of these. Moreover, it may also represent the inherent tensions which a comparative institutional analysis undertaken from the perspective of a constitutional adjudicator entails, including many of the 'Institutionalists'' reflections, primarily Komesar, on judicial review. The paper will thus follow these two sources of inspiration.
The phrase 'judicial activism' has popular origins. Recent works 35 concerning the term and its conceptualization have emphasized its first recorded use in a magazine article meant for a general audience, written by a non-lawyer, 36 as a symbol of an intrinsic '-ism difficulty' in definition.
The same scholars have, however, insisted on the utility of a conceptual and historical analysis of 'judicial activism', since it has already become a tool that is too widespread in making critical reviews of judges' behaviour to be ignored or avoided. This, the authors believe, should yield clearer perceptions of judicial behaviour and "might reduce destructive schisms between expert and non-expert discussions of judicial role". 37 Various exercises of categorization have been proposed: their usefulness, like all comparative 'ideal types', needs to be tested when applied to the study of a single peculiar order. As already mentioned, the risk of acontextual 38 research in this field, where several context-specific factors cross each other 'politically', seems particularly strong. On the other hand, it also seems necessary to clear the field of those overly 'politicized' approaches that have made the term laden with a clearly pejorative connotation, automatically linked to a certain political vision: in other words, the problem needs to be assessed on a value-free level, in order to avoid 'judicial activism' from simply being used to mean 'a decision one does not like '. 39 This initial, basic difficulty in the transition from popular/political jargon to a legal conceptualization is also the reason why it seems better to make a judicious use of these works and their attempts to clarify this issue. Rather than making an abstract use of them for quantitative, statistical inquiries, 40 it seems more appropriate to take advantage of the aforementioned works by considering them as attempts to outline composite models and composite categories: one can then collect around them a number of issues raised by the study of the function of the judiciary in constitutionalist climates, at least the most sensitive ones relating to the variety of ways in which courts can impact society. This seems, in fact, to be the same concern that has inspired, ex ante, the recent works of those scholars who, belonging to different environments and moving from different cultural backgrounds, have proposed 'multi- better to avoid the search for a clear-cut definition based on a single criterion, 41 and to benefit from recognising the variety of meanings, the variety of expressions of 'activism'. Each of these meanings should be assessed separately, as a single question about the function of the judiciary and as a facet of the debate on the 'third branch of government' in its role as a "participant in a network of interaction with other social, political and institutional players".
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It also seems better to rely on exercises of broad categorization, free from excessive particularism, which can best fulfil this function.
In the light of these reflections, rather than using the dozens of strict parameters for evaluation identified in one of the most recent works on the matter, 43 I will adopt one of the first, classic works of 'multi-layered' categorization as a paradigm -Bradley Canon's work on his 'six dimensions of judicial activism' 44 -which represents both a careful survey of the extensive previous literature 45 and a basis for subsequent attempts by scholars.
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The structure of the paper will thus mirror these 'six dimensions', trying to sketch, despite the limitations of space, the historical questions of constitutional theory that are begged and their institutional implications. I will analyse the role and the work of constitutional courts in the light of the majoritarian principle, their scope of action and the specificity of their interventions, the theoretical and practical availability of alternative policymakers, and their interpretative fidelity and stability. In each of these dimensions we can see spaces in which a prototypical 'activist' court can move, spaces that can be sometimes discretionally used and even filled, spaces that can be usefully studied both from a legal and an institutional point of view.
In trying to shape, through these heuristic devices, useful ideal types that are applicable to most patterns of study, we must remember to assess some base arguments about the function of the judiciary in constitutional frameworks. The first argument follows the classic vision of the judiciary as the branch that is allotted the power to resolve legal disputes by applying existing law and superior parameters, and -in advance and facing different degrees of complexity -by determining 41 See Richard Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform, 314, 318 (Cambridge, MA 1996 Under the third perspective, the role of courts in constitutional arrangements is viewed as one that expands beyond the protection of political processes to an active and massive role in the protection of constitutionally sanctioned core values. This latter phenomenon, in marked expansion, has been traced by scholars to the particularities of our historical juncture, and has recently been extensively studied in both physiological and positive aspects as well as in critical ones.
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In the awareness of such classic and new challenges in the 'law and politics' debate, we can now turn to a more accurate and methodical analysis, developing the aforementioned 'multidimensional' model chosen for this study and looking for clearer meanings of the 'activism' of judicial branches.
Majoritarianism
Majoritarianism is probably the most frequent and, so to speak, automatic criterion used in assessing courts' activism, a kind of 'conditioned reflex' in the criticism of judicial behaviour. 1643 (2006) of the political branches and, by extension, the will of the majority itself. Such an action is often criticised from the perspective of democratic theory, wielding the sword of an alleged intrinsic 'illegitimacy' of the practice. What kind (and degree) of 'illegitimacy' are we talking about? What kind of institutional balance is shaped by the position of a hierarchically superior constitution to be enforced even against the will of the contingent majority? These questions can perhaps receive reassuring answers nowadays, at least in politically homogeneous legal orders where there are no crucial structural divergences between judicial bodies and legislatures, and when the actions of the courts do not take up any clear contrasting positions against the active politics of the moment.
However, in most cases, in circumstances where tension between political actors arises, an unwelcome judgment inevitably provokes complaints of an 'invasion of the field' and accusations of misuse of a political role which is considered to be inconsistent with the constitutional jurisdiction.
This difficult, yet not precarious, balance is probably the best updated and pondered explanation of Bickel's famous and profoundly influential counter-majoritarian difficulty.
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His landmark description of the "countermajoritarian" and "deviant" role of judicial review 52 was, in fact, the unveiling of an intrinsic difficulty which needs to be understood, approached and minimized, and not the denunciation of a plain inconsistency, of something presumptively at odds with democracy. Although often misconceived or taken out of context, his reflections represented the clear statement of the ontological premises of a fair analysis, and part of a preponderant pars construens, suggesting several interpretative paradigms and trying to balance framers' will and social change, case by case approach and principles, ultimately judicial review and democracy. The answer to the basic question of whether or not judicial review could nonetheless be democratically legitimate, at least if practised or constituted in a particular way, has seemed and seems already to be defined: being aware of this intrinsic difficulty and its consequences, judicial insulation from the popular will (elections) allows the judiciary to be faithful to the sovereign will (the constitution), and it is therefore an asset to be defended.
Of course, it is also true that whatever Bickel actually meant by the phrase in the specific historic context in which he was working, it has now taken on a life of its own. It has become a profoundly influential starting point for those who critically examine the relationship between democracy and constitutional judicial review, although other voices have denounced the inadequacies of a simplistic adherence to its framework. This branch of criticism is based on a typical, and rather simple, 'single-institutional' perspective. One of the underlying assumptions here 
. When the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. That, without mystic overtones, is what actually happens", ivi
seems to be "the prevailing notion that government institutions act rationally to achieve their goals"; 53 and the question raised about these institutions involves their legitimacy -"that is whether their actions correspond with the common good".
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Critics think that, presumably, the 'common good' will be advanced by the political branches in a democratic system, "at least in the absence of particularized distortions like discrimination", 55 because these institutions are controlled by the populace. Most courts, and particularly constitutional courts, are believed to be more problematic because they are not directly subject to the electoral process or the supervision of any elected official, but only to words written in a statute, a group of previous decisions, or a constitution.
Within a more comprehensive perspective it has been pointed out and complex' structures -the political process and the judicial process. In this sense, the sort of symmetry assumed in the counter-majoritarian framework is disavowed; and allegations of activism made about the courts are returned for additional investigation on input and output dynamics.
Furthermore, it is highlighted that all liberal democratic systems have other significant 'countermajoritarian' elements than courts, including bodies within the political branches themselves: 64 "judicial review is only one of many 'undemocratic' institutional choices" in modern constitutional orders. This is indeed a clearly growing phenomenon, generally typical of those same 'welfare systems' described by Cappelletti and mentioned previously. In our ever increasingly complex legal orders, the structure of delegations is becoming broader, and is not limited to the judicial bodies. Few would argue that all these mechanisms are necessarily 'deviant', and such an answer seems to work well and to become typical, 65 turning the alleged vice into a virtue: the insulated, countermajoritarian nature of institutions (including courts) can be a positive feature, because it can be a solution for them to better -and independently -perform their duties. Courts are uniquely well situated to protect the rights of individuals or disadvantaged groups against an excessively powerful majority, as well as to resolve federal disputes 66 or inter-branch conflicts.
According to this more positive account, judicial review is clearly not a 'deviant' institution but one that upholds fundamental democratic values: not notwithstanding, but precisely because of its deviant potential. As already mentioned, not only has Bickel himself concluded that judicial review could be legitimated because the courts could serve as 'fora of principle ' and reason, 67 Ibid., at 266 a number of benefits, as well as a number of problems.
One has to be aware of the inherent 'countermajoritarian difficulty' in order to pursue any kind of sophisticated analysis in the field. 'Countermajoriarianism' can be understood as a heuristic, posing a stylized question -exceptional though it might be -and provoking a general inquiry into the appropriate sources of authority for judicial decision-making. However, it seems there can be no 'activism' just because of a theoretical role, of an assigned position. It would seem that if we want to try to define 'judicial activism', we must turn our attention to the other dimensions of the activity of the courts and to other dimensions of their inter-branch relations.
Substance/democratic process distinction
Another traditional line of criticism rests on considerations that seem to assess, again, more the position than the effective action of the courts, or at least both dimensions. It is often argued, with different arguments from country to country and in the wake of a historic American debate, that there is greater justification for court policymaking in some areas than in others: and that the only concrete boundary that can be traced in this regard is between judicial interventions in substantive policy areas and judicial interventions ensuring minimal "representation- It is notorious that, bearing in mind these suggestions, the US Supreme Court has followed an expressed "preferred position" doctrine for about a decade, subjecting laws impinging on the political process to greater judicial scrutiny.
Further, it has built its complex and plural reasoning of the following years on a rhetoric reminiscent of it.
The academic debate has proposed some persuasive solutions to the countermajoritarian Review, 121 Harvard Law Review 1693 , 1699 (2008 designed to safeguard minimal social rules and core individual rights. If judicial review reduces the likelihood that important rights and basic rules will be infringed, then it may actually enhance, rather than undermine, a governmental regime's overall political legitimacy. Vice versa, an activist court, if it were intrusive, would undermine both these features.
This influential current of thought does not deny the inherent difficulties that are raised with the intrusion of courts into substantive policies. It does, however, emphasize the best adequacy of third, independent bodies to correct -if requested by the parties themselves -matters related to citizens' opportunities for input into the policymaking system, even if this occurs through a different kind of policymaking. In its early expressions, constructed in the light of the mid-century American experience, this theory focused on several evident and sensitive issues involving (among others) freedom of expression, the franchise, conduct of elections, the nature of representation.
Quite obviously, however, a clear distinction between judicial decisions relating to the integrity of the democratic political process and others affecting more substantive policy areas is not always easy to draw: indeed, it is chiefly this area of dispute that renders this 'process-related' argument an important element in a discussion of activism. The fact is that this argument seems persuasive -it is, indeed, the most consistent with the constitutional mandate of the courts -but it leaves open, again, important problems of definition. The distinction, put to the test of legal interpretation, can be proved as having very blurred boundaries. Not only can many of the spheres of political action be somehow traced back to the opening of channels of political participation; but also the negative definition, by a kind of process of exclusion, a contrario, does not seem to provide any firm and reliable results. Moreover, another famous critical review, by Laurence Tribe, 81 insisted that Ely and the 'proceduralists' have not managed yet to escape substantive constitutional law by championing political process, because the priority they give to process really amounts to a substantive value that posits, in effect, that more process and wider participation are always preferable and beneficial to the polity. 82 Komesar's 'participation-centered approach' also rejects the underlying simplistic allocation of societal issues -"render unto the political process that which is the political process ' (substance) and render unto the courts that which is the courts' (process)".
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Comparative institutional analysis teaches us here that this neat split of issues, along with the underlying idea that judicial review can take place without any judicial value judgments being made, "is based on a basic misconception". the same societal policy already assessed by the competing institution. Ely's belief that reaction to the (various) forms of political malfunctions should be important in defining the judicial role is the first element in an analysis of the allocation of decisionmaking powers. However an appropriate analysis also requires consideration of the ability of the judiciary to make, or remake, societal decisions: and such questions of relative institutional ability cannot be hidden behind oversimplistic and falsely reassuring dichotomies. The essence of Ely's theory is therefore 'single-
institutional': "each institution is disqualified from a realm of activity by its imperfections without regard to the limitations of the other institution in the same realm".
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Such a schematic assessment of the variety of political malfunctions and of the ability to address them cannot be an adequate substitute for institutional comparison; 87 nor can it be a mask behind which to hide substantive judicial decisions.
Specificity of policy
According to a traditional reading, consistent with a certain formal vision of their constitutional mandate, courts step into public policy only to nullify laws, in their capacity as "negative legislators". Such intervention is constitutionally pre-ordained to leave legislators or administrators, as positive actors, free to pursue different approaches to a given problem, with the awareness and in light of the judicial choice. This view is the closest to the static design of a trias politica, and is coherent with Kelsen's traditional architecture.
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From a functional viewpoint, the division of powers seems relatively clear, calling the judiciary to a kind of actio finium regundorum of the discretion of the political powers. political decisions, within its framework of superior 'rules of the game', may not be filled by courts, and these are not called upon to anticipate or design any legislative measures but to review them after having been taken. A clear departure from these minimal functional rules would constitute evidence of an activist approach by the courts. 
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This often means that less required future judicial activity can mean more judicial activism.
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The transformation of our legal orders and of the modalities of public intervention has sometimes been intentional and preordained and sometimes not, but it clearly leads to an increasing shift of positive policymaking power to insulated institutions. It seems clear, from a critical perspective, that the opening of such spaces can be an opportunity to pursue intrusive, active, teleologically-oriented policies. It remains to be determined -and this is not simple -whether or not a composite body like a tribunal can have its own global policies pursued and, therefore, its ability to coherently pursue them, in the form of 'many-mind arguments'.
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Certainly some historical experiences have given rise to suspicion and persuasive reconstructions. On other occasions, scholars may have abused similar arguments, tracing complex dynamics back to a single fictitious rationality.
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As far as the concrete case study is concerned, similar questions can only receive specific, empirical answers. This is sometimes the source of accurate casuistic, historical, behavioural analyses, while for some others it is the realm of a certain various 'courts and politics' literature 122 which can be particularly effective in some cases, and simply seem naïve in others.
Nevertheless, regardless for now of the possible responses and modalities of an empirical study, the expansion of discretionary spaces available to courts has re-ignited the theoretical debate. 
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In terms of trends, it seems that traditional constitutional scholars have focused their attention, essentially, on two interrelated questions. Firstly, does another agency have more expertise and access to information to make policy than the supreme or constitutional court in question? Secondly (and more in general), does another agency have the authority to make policy and, if so, is it politically or practically feasible for it to do so?
As for the first aspect, of course the 'information deficit' represents the other side of the coin of judges' relative social insulation. It is a natural consequence of one of the distinctive structural elements of the adjudicative process.
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From this perspective, judges can lay claim to no particular proficiency in substantive policy areas, either in terms of specialized knowledge or of specialized staff for in-depth research on non-legal aspects of the issues posed in many cases. However, the ability of judges to learn about and understand a given substantive area affects the tractability and costs of judicial review of that area, and this ability can vary widely among substantive areas. As 
Interpretative fidelity
Despite having started from macro-assessments of the 'judicial activism' debate, after a complex and structural analysis one arrives at a point at which an evaluation of the more internal dimensions of judicial activity is necessary. Even an inquiry on apparently remote matters such as that carried out so far, including an assessment of technical and political expertise of courts, will lead us, eventually, to the study of models of legal reasoning and interpretation employed by courts.
Whether we examine technical decision-making or the value choices of courts, we need an analysis of the 'language' judges speak in taking these decisions and making these choices. By adopting an institutional perspective we discover, nonetheless, that even behind a seemingly formalist "process of reasoned, public justification according to a set of legal and moral standard", 137 basic and structural choices are hidden.
A study of the legal reasoning of courts is an inquiry into the 'logic' of their judicial decision making. This concerns the kind of arguments given by judges, the relationship between the reasons and the decisions, and the adequacy of these reasons as a support for the decisions. From a critical perspective, typical of our inquiry, it is sometimes said that judges do not always reveal the real reasons for their decisions, and that the reasons they do present are no more than rationalizations for the results they reach, 138 derived from the requirements of the constitution itself. This claim is presumably intended to suggest that it is necessary to take into account factors that lie outside explicitly given reasons, in order to explain why a case is decided in a certain way: and probably, such a realist analysis can be addressed by each of the criteria already suggested to give depth to the concept of 'judicial activism'.
In contrast, other criteria involving legal interpretation are commonly suggested as direct expressions of misused judicial discretion. Such criteria have been the object of a long-standing and engaging debate, probably as old as the constitutional norms to which they relate; and due to their inherent complexity, it is difficult to summarize the begged questions in a few lines. In this context, at the expense of some simplification, I will therefore only analyse their supposed connection with the phenomenon of activism, trying to adopt an institutional perspective.
That the 'interpretative fidelity' category comes into the discussion is no surprise, since it is part, again, of a kind of a common critical perception of the role of courts (perhaps the same that we see in the 'absolutization' of the countermajoritarian criterion discussed above). This dimension would measure courts' "actual or inferential construction" These are, in a nutshell, the questions at stake. It seems to me that the approach adopted here facilitates the research, because rather than looking for solutions (if they exist), an abstract inquiry into activism can limit itself to emphasizing the inner criticality of such questions and any consequent potential deviations. While conceding the necessity for discretion in applying vague phrases to specific situations, critics of activism on this dimension argue that the Constitution is not a constitution if it can be altered at the will of five or nine judges in the course of a lawsuit (to echo Bickel's emphatic words). Although it is a basic law "intended to endure for ages to come", 143 it does not follow that a constitutional court can ignore the very words of the document. Special amending processes are explicitly provided, if particular provisions prove unpopular or dysfunctional. Supporters of a certain discretion argue here that a court's main function is the smooth application of a 'living' document, often framed in a distant past, to modern problems which may require new meanings for old provisions. It is the 'spirit of the law', they think, rather than the exact wording of the framers' time-bound intentions, that is important.
Comparatively, the judges' arsenal of professional techniques and legal arguments for the (1819) application of norms is often similar, while, apart from some specific contemporary experiences, constitutional texts do not normally provide specific guidance. The courts' judicial discourse is shaped through the employment of some textual methods, such as the plain literal and the contextual one, and some extra-textual methods, such as the historical and the teleological.
However, such common 'language' -composed of the same 'tools' -can be used to construct rather different, sometimes contrasting, arguments. The guiding preference in this work of interpretation and application is often an institutional choice and, at the same time, is the reason for external charges of 'activism'.
With regard to wording and textual methods, the term 'activist' will be applied to "any decision that appears to clearly contradict any constitutional provision in terms of the ordinary meaning of its wording, or any decision that is contrary to the logical implications of two or more provisions considered together". is partly a product of their evaluations about their own distinctive role as a social institution. It is reasonable to believe that judges are not well-equipped to engage in theoretically ambitious tasks, without also believing that political theory is itself problematic or useless.
Looking at the extra-textual methods, we face the tensions and challenges due to the essence of the constitution as a document with both a crucial strong source and precise, long-standing purposes. Especially at a certain stage of the American debate, some prominent authors (such as Bork, 150 Scalia, 151 and Rehnquist
152
) have stressed the point of the "framers' original intentions" as the only canon of interpretation available for the judges to reconcile their structural lack of democratic legitimacy with reference to the "original" will of "the people". Their approaches were somewhat different, but have come to profoundly affect the global debate (perhaps more than the actual activities of the courts). Any kind of open, evolutionary interpretation would be, in their view, inevitably exposed to subjective views and, in particular, to judges' political options: while Bickel formulated the 'countermajoritarian difficulty' on the (realist, Holmesian) assumption that a creative component was inherent in the judicial function, the 'originalists' have used the argument of the lack of democratic legitimacy to raise, again, the idea that it was up to courts only to 'find' the right, as pre-existing essences. The search for an objective meaning, static in time, linked to an 'original intent theory' bargaining political process in favour of the insularity of third bodies. Nonetheless, albeit to different degrees, a large number of critical commentators commonly categorize as activist those decisions seen as interpreting a provision contrary to 'their' supposed reasonably clear and consensual intentions of its writers. More specific illustrations can be found in some typical cases.
Firstly, we can consider those decisions applying a provision to a situation existing at the time of the provision's adoption, where it is clear that the drafters did not intend it to apply. The history of the US Supreme court gives us some notorious historical case studies, analysed by several scholars 157 dealing with the question. Secondly and more commonly, however, there are those decisions which apply constitutional norms to situations where the drafters did not and could not anticipate any application. It is easier here to exemplify, by finding hints in almost every constitutional environment. The most widely known case is, of course, the US Court's extensive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's 'due process clause'.
Interpretative stability
Several supreme courts and constitutional courts hold, in addition to a 'nomopoietic' function, a broad 'nomophylactic' one. They are also φυλακες, 'guardians', of the uniform interpretation of the law and of the coherence of the legal order to which they belong. In fulfilling this function, they indirectly protect and promote equality before the law. For this reason, when examining the dimension of courts' interpretative stability, one should look both inward and outwards: at stake are both the coherence of tribunals with their own arguments, their own reasoning, their own established line of cases shaping a narrative of the legal order, and the consistency and certainty in the relations between the powers of the state and the individual citizens.
'Interpretative stability' is an important element in the debate over the merits of activism, although it is often unrecognized as such and its components are often poorly articulated. In general, from an institutionalist viewpoint, 158 it studies the 'management' by the courts of their case-law and its development. It measures the degree to which a court decision either retains or abandons precedent or existing judicial doctrine, studying the dynamics of the relationship between the obligation to stare decisis and the legal reasoning of the court itself. After all, a common perception in reading some classics of American constitutional theory and constitutional history is that in some phases the Supreme Court (especially -but not only -the Warren Court) has been criticized more for the frequency and scope of its radical alterations of prior jurisprudence than for the antimajoritarian nature of its decisions.
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The presence of previous case-law and the formal or informal tie to respect for precedents can be at the same time a constraint for the work of the courts and an opportunity for new discretionary activity. Firstly, a certain discretionary power of management of case-law seems to lie in the choice of the cases to be treated. Where a formal power of certiorari is not provided, courts have in any case obtained, through various techniques and different interpretations of the concepts of standing and justiciability, important spaces of discretion. An analysis of the use and misuse of such spaces, in the ex ante selection of the jurisprudential narrative of a legal order, is undoubtedly part of the debate on 'activism', given the possible instrumentality of such choices. In any case, the most dramatic caesura, the most dramatic instance of interpretative instability, obviously occurs when a court explicitly overrules one of its own earlier decisions. A loss of legal certainty is directly implied; in addition, several methodological questions, with strong practical consequences, arise.
The first questions are in terms of transparency: judges usually are straightforward about such shifts, with explicit statements of overruling; sometimes they are indirect or reticent, creating even more uncertainty and further complicating the interpretative framework. Moreover, a court can also weaken a precedent, more or less radically, again without formally overruling it; or, conversely, it can enhance a precedent by expanding its interpretation, applying it to a new legal area, or giving it hitherto rejected or unforeseen implications. In deciding what a precedent means, it seems that a court should pay attention to comparative institutional considerations too, at least in terms of judicial fallibility ("judges might not know what they are doing" course, some reduction or growth in scope and reasoning naturally occurs. It is normal that, over time, subsequent decisions may put some limits on a precedent's applicability, or vice versa may find new patterns of application, perhaps by analogy. But when a precedent is drastically weakened, say by a single subsequent decision which greatly restricts its scope, possibly compromising its logic, the ideal of interpretative stability is equally weakened. And most importantly, sometimes one can find an instrumental use for such processes, which is probably one of the most frequent accusations of the discretion of the courts: for example, this can be seen in the widespread case of step-by-step introductions of new doctrines and policies (in the way that, somewhat banally, commonly goes by the name of 'judicial agenda' 162 ).
A final, perhaps obvious, remark on this point links the dimension of 'interpretative stability' even more closely with most of the other criteria already examined, and seems to close the circle of our reflections. The parameter by which the stability in question is measured may not necessarily be a precedent, meant as a previous judicial decision on the same matter. Another baseline is the concept of the 'ongoing interpretation' of the constitution, intended as the "inferential interpretation of constitutional meaning drawn from longstanding and/or widespread laws and practices".
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Despite the apparent vagueness of this concept, its meaning is clear, and consistent with the evolving debate on activism as a whole. The mode, degrees and acceptability of judicial discretion should be evaluated in light of the diversity of voices within the plural constitutional community, taking into account different perspectives and different interpretations, trying to combine legal and political analysis. This also allows for a better assessment of the general external perception of the role of the court itself, fundamental ingredient of their legitimacy. The evaluation of this 'external component', its weight and its value, remains the biggest issue underlying the entire 'judicial activism' debate, and perhaps hindering the possibility of its sure dogmatic definition. However, it underlines the necessary correlation -in direct proportionality -of the constitutional justice organs with the social consensus itself on the constitution.
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Perhaps this can be described as an 'original sin', being a common accusation also to Justice Marshall and to the historical introduction of judicial review of legislation in the US. On the legitimacy of strategic action by the courts one can recall the controversy between A. Bickel and Herbert Weschler, on which see G. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 'Passive Virtues' -A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Columbia Law Review 1 passim (1964) 
